Games, decisions, and markets

By:

Sakai, Yasuhiro

Material type: Text

TextSeries: New Frontiers in Regional Science: Asian Perspectives (NFRSASIPER)Publication details: Singapore Springer 2024Description: xvi, 232 pISBN:

9789819952847

Subject(s):

Emerging markets--Globalization

DDC classification:

330.0724 SAK

Summary: This book critically discusses the historical backgrounds and new developments of the theories of games, decisions, and markets, with many possible applications to social and economic problems. Consisting of three connected parts, the book sheds new light on the role of merchants in the market economy under conditions of risk and uncertainty. Part I begins with the question of why and how John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern did joint work in game theory, namely, the theoretical study of strategic interactions among several decision makers. The duel between Sherlock Holmes and Professor Moriarty in Conan Doyle's famous detective story is recalled as a great inducement to Neumann and Morgenstern to invent zero-sum, two-person games. More general non-zero-sum games and associated Nash solutions are then discussed in relation to the generation-gap problem between a young couple and an elderly couple. Part II explores a set of very fundamental problems of individual decision making. Thetwo famous axioms of revealed preference ― Samuelson's weak axiom and Houthakker's axiom ― are skillfully connected and empirically reevaluated by the introduction of certain regularity conditions. The revealed preference approach is then extended from the original commodity space to the dual price space. Such dual treatment in microeconomics is further applied to the theory of cost and production, with the decomposition of the total factor price effect into the substitution and scale effects. Part III turns the reader’s attention to the interdependence of several markets. The almost forgotten Hicks–Morishima approach is newly revived with graphical illustrations of traded goods. The well-known Jones–Kemp approach to international trade is boldly expanded into the world of risk and uncertainty. Some striking results in comparative static analysis are derived, with favorable implications for the real world. (https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-981-99-5285-4)

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Holdings
Item type	Current library	Collection	Call number	Copy number	Status	Date due	Barcode
Book	Indian Institute of Management LRC General Stacks	Public Policy & General Management	330.0724 SAK (Browse shelf(Opens below))	1	Available		009029

Table of contents:
Front Matter
Pages i-xvi
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Games
Front Matter
Pages 1-1
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Von Neumann, Morgenstern, and Theory of Games: Critical Reassessment of Zero-Sum Games
Yasuhiro Sakai
Pages 3-21
Reassessing Zero-Sum Games: Various Types of Matching Pennies
Yasuhiro Sakai
Pages 23-53
Non-zero-sum Games and Nash Equilibriums: Applications to Generation Gaps Problems
Yasuhiro Sakai
Pages 55-71
Decisions
Front Matter
Pages 73-73
Download chapter PDF
Consumer Decisions and Revealed Preference: Reevaluating Samuelson’s Foundations of Economic Analysis
Yasuhiro Sakai
Pages 75-91
Revealed Favorability and Indirect Utility: A Modern Approach
Yasuhiro Sakai
Pages 93-118
Producer Decision and Input Demand Theory: An Axiomatic Approach
Yasuhiro Sakai
Pages 119-151
Substitution and Expansion Effects in Production: The General Case of Joint Production
Yasuhiro Sakai
Pages 153-181
Markets
Front Matter
Pages 183-183
Download chapter PDF
Interdependence of Several Markets: The Hicks–Morishima Approach Reconsidered
Yasuhiro Sakai
Pages 185-203
International Trade Under Risk: Comparative Static Analysis
Yasuhiro Sakai
Pages 205-232

[https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-981-99-5285-4]

This book critically discusses the historical backgrounds and new developments of the theories of games, decisions, and markets, with many possible applications to social and economic problems. Consisting of three connected parts, the book sheds new light on the role of merchants in the market economy under conditions of risk and uncertainty. Part I begins with the question of why and how John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern did joint work in game theory, namely, the theoretical study of strategic interactions among several decision makers. The duel between Sherlock Holmes and Professor Moriarty in Conan Doyle's famous detective story is recalled as a great inducement to Neumann and Morgenstern to invent zero-sum, two-person games. More general non-zero-sum games and associated Nash solutions are then discussed in relation to the generation-gap problem between a young couple and an elderly couple. Part II explores a set of very fundamental problems of individual decision making. Thetwo famous axioms of revealed preference ― Samuelson's weak axiom and Houthakker's axiom ― are skillfully connected and empirically reevaluated by the introduction of certain regularity conditions. The revealed preference approach is then extended from the original commodity space to the dual price space. Such dual treatment in microeconomics is further applied to the theory of cost and production, with the decomposition of the total factor price effect into the substitution and scale effects. Part III turns the reader’s attention to the interdependence of several markets. The almost forgotten Hicks–Morishima approach is newly revived with graphical illustrations of traded goods. The well-known Jones–Kemp approach to international trade is boldly expanded into the world of risk and uncertainty. Some striking results in comparative static analysis are derived, with favorable implications for the real world.

(https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-981-99-5285-4)

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