000			01994nam a22002177a 4500
999			_c3596 _d3596
005			20230103155219.0
008			230103b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
020			_a9780691003542
082			_a332.4973 _bFRI
100			_aFriedman, Milton _94515
245			_aA monetary history of the United states, 1867-1960
260			_bPrinceton University Press _aPrinceton _c1993
300			_axxiv, 860 p.
365			_aUSD _b69.95
520			_aWriting in the June 1965 issue of theEconomic Journal, Harry G. Johnson begins with a sentence seemingly calibrated to the scale of the book he set himself to review: “The long-awaited monetary history of the United States by Friedman and Schwartz is in every sense of the term a monumental scholarly achievement — monumental in its sheer bulk, monumental in the definitiveness of its treatment of innumerable issues, large and small … monumental, above all, in the theoretical and statistical effort and ingenuity that have been brought to bear on the solution of complex and subtle economic issues.” Friedman and Schwartz marshaled massive historical data and sharp analytics to support the claim that monetary policy — steady control of the money supply — matters profoundly in the management of the nation’s economy, especially in navigating serious economic fluctuations. In their influential chapter 7, The Great Contraction — which Princeton published in 1965 as a separate paperback — they address the central economic event of the century, the Depression. According to Hugh Rockoff, writing in January 1965: “If Great Depressions could be prevented through timely actions by the monetary authority (or by a monetary rule), as Friedman and Schwartz had contended, then the case for market economies was measurably stronger.”
650			_aMonetary policy _92120
650			_aCurrency question _95258
650			_aBanks and banking _9442
700			_aSchwartz, Anna _911225
942			_2ddc _cBK