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008 220628b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
020 _a9781108708395
082 _a330
_bVOI
100 _aVoigt, Stefan
_96857
245 _aConstitutional economics: a primer
260 _bCambridge University Press
_aNew York
_c2020
300 _a138 p.
365 _aGBP
_b19.99
504 _aTable of Contents Introduction 1. Conceptual Foundations 2. Democracy vs. Autocracy 3. Positive Constitutional Economics 4. Conclusions – and Possible Future Issues Appendix 1. Coding Countries According to Two Governance Scores Appendix 2. Empirical Results at a Glance: Constitutional Rules as Explanatory Variables, Cross-Country Results Unless Otherwise Noted
520 _aConstitutional political economy has emerged as an indispensable part of political economy. This book offers a concise survey of the questions, methods, and empirical findings central to this topic. What effects – if any – do constitutions have within autocracies? Can small electoral districts help reduce corruption? Does a country's leadership affect the size of its government? Can direct democratic institutions increase politicians' accountability to citizens? Stefan Voigt, a pioneer in the field, explores these questions and more throughout the course of this cutting-edge primer. As the number of courses in constitutional economics continues to grow, this book fills an important gap in the literature. This highly original project maintains curiosity about the questions it generates, identifying potential new areas of research whilst successfully demonstrating the impact constitutional rules have on political economy. Accessible to readers without any prior familiarity of the topic Fills a gap in the literature of political economy by providing an overview of an up-and-coming, increasingly relevant field Forthcoming about gaps and weaknesses in the field, which will help those searching for their own research topics to easily identify topics to explore
650 _aConstitutional law--Economic aspects
_96987
650 _aEconomic policy
_92380
650 _aEconomics--Political aspects
_96988
942 _2ddc
_cBK