000			01816nam a22002297a 4500
999			_c2588 _d2588
005			20220720152653.0
008			220720b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
020			_a9781108738279
082			_a328.73 _bAND
100			_aAnderson, Sarah E. _97919
245			_aRejecting compromise: legislators' fear of primary voters
260			_bCambridge University Press _aNew Jersey _c2021
300			_ax, 172 p.
365			_aGBP _b17.99
520			_aLegislative solutions to pressing problems like balancing the budget, climate change, and poverty usually require compromise. Yet national, state, and local legislators often reject compromise proposals that would move policy in their preferred direction. Why do legislators reject such agreements? This engaging and relevant investigation into how politicians think reveals that legislators refuse compromise - and exacerbate gridlock - because they fear punishment from voters in primary elections. Prioritizing these electoral interests can lead lawmakers to act in ways that hurt their policy interests and also overlook the broader electorate's preferences by representing only a subset of voters with rigid positions. With their solution-oriented approach, Anderson, Butler, and Harbridge-Yong demonstrate that improving the likelihood of legislative compromise may require moving negotiations outside of the public spotlight. Highlighting key electoral motives underlying polarization, this book is an excellent resource for scholars and students studying Congress, American politics, public policy, and political behavior.
650			_aPolitics and government _91893
650			_aUnited States. Congress _97920
650			_aGovernment productivity _97136
700			_aButler, Daniel M. _97921
700			_aHarbridge-Yong, Laurel _97922
942			_2ddc _cBK