000			02006nam a22002177a 4500
999			_c1343 _d1343
005			20211012104320.0
008			211012b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
020			_a9780521288842
082			_a575 _bSMI
100			_aSmith, John Maynard _94048
245			_aEvolution and the theory of games
260			_bCambridge University Press _aCambridge _c2012
300			_aviii, 224 p.
365			_aGBP _b48.99
504			_aTable of Contents 1. Introduction 2. The basic model 3. The war of attrition 4. Games with genetic models 5. Learning the ESS 6. Mixed strategies-I. A classification of mechanisms 7. Mixed strategies-II. Examples 8. Asymmetric games-I. Ownership 9. Asymmetric games-II. A classification, and some illustrative examples 10. Asymmetric games-III. Sex and generation games 11. Life history strategies and the size game 12. Honesty, bargaining and commitment 13. The evolution of cooperation 14. Postscript Appendices.
520			_aIn this 1982 book, the theory of games, first developed to analyse economic behaviour, is modified so that it can be applied to evolving populations. John Maynard Smith's concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy is relevant whenever the best thing for an animal or plant to do depends on what others are doing. The theory leads to testable predictions about the evolution of behaviour, of sex and genetic systems, and of growth and life history patterns. This book contains a full account of the theory, and of the data relevant to it. The account is aimed at senior undergraduate and graduate students, teachers and research workers in animal behaviour, population genetics and evolutionary biology. The book will also be of interest to mathematicians and game theorists; the mathematics has been largely confined to appendixes so that the main text may be easily followed by biologists.
650			_aGame theory _94049
650			_aEvolution (Biology)--Mathematical models _94050
650			_aEvolution _94051
942			_2ddc _cBK