An introduction to game theory
- London Oxford University Press 2012
- 552 p.
Table of contents
Chapter 1. Introduction I. GAMES WITH PERFECT INFORMATION Chapter 2. Nash Equilibrium: Theory Chapter 3. Nash Equilibrium: Illustrations Chapter 4. Mixed Strategy Equilibrium Chapter 5. Extensive Games with Perfect Information: Theory Chapter 6. Extensive Games With Perfect Information: Illustrations Chapter 7. Extensive Games With Perfect Information: Extensions and Discussion Chapter 8. Coalitional Games and the Core Chapter 9. Games with Imperfect Information Chapter 10. Extensive Games with Imperfect Information II. VARIANTS AND EXTENSIONS Chapter 11. Strictly Competitive Games and Maxminimization Chapter 12. Rationalizability Chapter 13. Evolutionary Equilibrium Chapter 14. Repeated Games: The Prisoner's Dilemma Chapter 15. Repeated Games: General Results Chapter 16. Bargaining Chapter 17. Appendix: Mathematics
An Introduction to Game Theory, by Martin J. Osborne, presents the main principles of game theory and shows how they can be used to understand economic, social, political, and biological phenomena. The book introduces in an accessible manner the main ideas behind the theory rather than their mathematical expression. All concepts are defined precisely, and logical reasoning is used throughout. The book requires an understanding of basic mathematics but assumes no specific knowledge of economics, political science, or other social or behavioral sciences. Game-theoretic reasoning pervades economic theory and is used widely in other social and behavioral sciences. An Introduction to Game Theory, by Martin J. Osborne, presents the main principles of game theory and shows how they can be used to understand economic, social, political, and biological phenomena. The book introduces in an accessible manner the main ideas behind the theory rather than their mathematical expression. All concepts are defined precisely, and logical reasoning is used throughout. The book requires an understanding of basic mathematics but assumes no specific knowledge of economics, political science, or other social or behavioral sciences. Coverage includes the fundamental concepts of strategic games, extensive games with perfect information, and coalitional games; the more advanced subjects of Bayesian games and extensive games with imperfect information; and the topics of repeated games, bargaining theory, evolutionary equilibrium, rationalizability, and maxminimization. The book offers a wide variety of illustrations from the social and behavioral sciences and more than 280 exercises. Each topic features examples that highlight theoretical points and illustrations that demonstrate how the theory may be used. Explaining the key concepts of game theory as simply as possible while maintaining complete precision, An Introduction to Game Theory is ideal for undergraduate and introductory graduate courses in game theory.