Twenty lectures on algorithmic game theory (Record no. 227)

MARC details
000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 02244nam a22002057a 4500
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20190831121337.0
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 190831b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER
International Standard Book Number 9781316624791
082 ## - DEWEY DECIMAL CLASSIFICATION NUMBER
Classification number 519.3
Item number ROU
100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Roughgarden, Tim
245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Twenty lectures on algorithmic game theory
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT)
Name of publisher, distributor, etc. Cambridge University Press
Place of publication, distribution, etc. Cambridge
Date of publication, distribution, etc. 2016
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Extent xiii, 341 p.
365 ## - TRADE PRICE
Price type code GBP
Price amount 24.99
504 ## - BIBLIOGRAPHY, ETC. NOTE
Bibliography, etc. note Table of Contents<br/>1. Introduction and examples<br/>2. Mechanism design basics<br/>3. Myerson's Lemma<br/>4. Algorithmic mechanism design 34<br/>5. Revenue-maximizing auctions<br/>6. Simple near-optimal auctions<br/>7. Multi-parameter mechanism design<br/>8. Spectrum auctions<br/>9. Mechanism design with payment constraints<br/>10. Kidney exchange and stable matching<br/>11. Selfish routing and the price of anarchy<br/>12. Network over-provisioning and atomic selfish routing<br/>13. Equilibria: definitions, examples, and existence<br/>14. Robust price-of-anarchy bounds in smooth games<br/>15. Best-case and strong Nash equilibria<br/>16. Best-response dynamics<br/>17. No-regret dynamics<br/>18. Swap regret and the Minimax theorem<br/>19. Pure Nash equilibria and PLS-completeness<br/>20. Mixed Nash equilibria and PPAD-completeness.
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc. Computer science and economics have engaged in a lively interaction over the past fifteen years, resulting in the new field of algorithmic game theory. Many problems that are central to modern computer science, ranging from resource allocation in large networks to online advertising, involve interactions between multiple self-interested parties. Economics and game theory offer a host of useful models and definitions to reason about such problems. The flow of ideas also travels in the other direction, and concepts from computer science are increasingly important in economics. This book grew out of the author's Stanford University course on algorithmic game theory, and aims to give students and other newcomers a quick and accessible introduction to many of the most important concepts in the field. The book also includes case studies on online advertising, wireless spectrum auctions, kidney exchange, and network management.
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Algorithms
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Game theory
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Source of classification or shelving scheme Dewey Decimal Classification
Koha item type Book
Holdings
Withdrawn status Lost status Source of classification or shelving scheme Damaged status Not for loan Collection code Bill No Bill Date Home library Current library Shelving location Date acquired Source of acquisition Cost, normal purchase price Total Checkouts Full call number Accession Number Date last seen Date checked out Copy number Cost, replacement price Price effective from Koha item type
    Dewey Decimal Classification     Operations Management & Quantitative Techniques IN28388 04-06-2019 Indian Institute of Management LRC Indian Institute of Management LRC General Stacks 06/20/2019 Overseas Press India Private 1567.17 2 519.3 ROU 000599 02/28/2023 02/28/2023 1 2339.06 08/31/2019 Book

©2019-2020 Learning Resource Centre, Indian Institute of Management Bodhgaya

Powered by Koha